.
One of the clearer lessons which emerges from the symposium on medical ethics from which the above scene is taken is that doctors and philosophers are often intensely suspicious of each other and where suspicion is intense understanding is usually clouded. Yet with such a strong prima facie case existing that moral philosophy can offer a valuable perspective for the study of medico-moral dilemmas something surely needs to be done to reduce this suspicion and increase mutual understanding.
One of the stock complaints from both sides is that the other is too ignorant of its approach and basic practice. Thus doctors complain that philosophers produce airy fairy intellectual arguments, schemes and systems which ignore the realities of medical practice while philosophers complain that doctors make moral decisions often without even recognising that they are doing so There can be no doubt that the suspicious and already primed defence reflexes of many doctors are often triggered by the obvious lack of understanding of the realities of medical practice manifested by some of those who demonstrate a non-medical interest in medical ethics. The latter however, usually find themselves in a doublebind for ifthey wish to increase their experience of medical practice they are likely in Britain at least to be rejected because of their alien and medically ignorant backgrounds. (For example, the desire of a professor of philosophy -known to the writer of this editorial -to be involved in just such clinical experience has so far gone unrequited). Sir Douglas's proposal would surely benefit both sides.
Conversely it seems entirely feasible for interested doctors and/or medical students to have basic academic training in relevant non-medical subjects such as philosophy, law and theology. The possibility of a one-year master's degree in medico-moral philosophy orientated specifically to doctors is under active consideration in at least one British university. Although it will not satisfy some philosophy academics who will claim that the standards achievable in only one year will be too low, it would be unrealistic to expect doctors -even interested doctors -to spend longer. Provided the function of such a year was clearly defined as being introductory -just as the medical year for non-doctors proposed by Sir Douglas Black is seen as introductory -the benefits would surely greatly outweigh the disadvantages. Among Mill's principle of autonomy quoted by Komrad offers only two qualifications: we must not interfere with other people's freedom (or autonomy) of thought and action provided these do not harm others and provided that the people thus respected possess a rather basic level of maturity (a capability 'of being improved by free and equal discussion'). Komrad, in suggesting that we need fully respect the autonomy only of those enjoying some (probably mythical) state of maximal and/or unimpaired autonomy of will and action is proposing a radical modification of Mill's widely accepted principle of autonomy. By his arguments no patient need have his autonomy fully respected since this autonomy is always impaired and 'never maximal'.
There will be those who for other reasons reject Mill's principle of autonomy: but Komrad's alternative proposal, attractive as it will be to many, simply does not follow from the alleged fact that illness always represents a state of diminished autonomy.
Case conference: Cutting the thread and pulling the wool 49 person, despite the danger that her deteriorating medical condition would make her more into an object to be appropriately managed. Once the question had been broadened out from the request for assisted suicide to this much more general and easily honoured request, the old relationship between doctor and patient could be re-established, without the parties feeling that their independence had been jeopardised as a result.
However Let us suppose, however, that the patient had taken an overdose of the pain-killers which her doctor had deliberately left in her keeping. Would Dr Carstairs then be 'legally in the wrong but emotionally right'? From my layman's perspective on the law I cannot see that he would have been legally culpable it.any way. He did not over-prescribe nor did he promise to be 'negligent' in any ordinary understanding ofthat term. His agreement not to resuscitate and not to call an ambulance seems to be in line with a general understanding of appropriate medical practice with someone who is so seriously and irremediably ill. So far as emotions are concerned, no doubt he would have felt considerable grief and guilt had his patient killed herself. In such a situation, however, someone would have had to help him see that much of this emerged from his deep involvement with the patient and her illness. Miss Gentilian was what could be described as a 'character' and if she had really wanted to commit suicide one might be sure that no one could have stopped her. As it happened, she just wanted to make a gesture about dying in her own way. Whatever she did she would have done it in her fashion and that remains the important moral value in such a case.
(Continued from page 4)
